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NIPPING CRIME IN THE BUD? THE USE OF ANTISOCIAL 
BEHAVIOUR INTERVENTIONS WITH YOUNG PEOPLE IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES
Sam Lewis*, Adam Crawford and Peter Traynor 
This article presents findings from a study of the use of antisocial behaviour (ASB) warning letters, 
Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs) and Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) with 3,481 
young people from four large metropolitan areas in England, which challenge dominant narratives 
about their use and impact. The findings unsettle prevailing beliefs concerning the targeted use of 
ASB interventions to tackle low-level incivilities and the timing of their use within a young person’s 
deviant trajectory. They also contest the logical sequencing of behaviour regulation strategies by 
demonstrating the haphazard deployment of ASB sanctions within complex webs of prevention, 
ASB and youth justice interventions. The article concludes by considering the findings alongside 
recent youth justice trends in England and Wales.
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Introduction
The late 1980s and 1990s saw a rise in media reports of incivilities and crime in areas of 
social housing amidst concern that police efforts to address such problems were being 
stymied by a lack of resources, witnesses and evidence (Card 2006: 52). A consultation 
paper published by the Labour Party, while in opposition, entitled A Quiet Life: Tough 
Action on Criminal Neighbours, proposed new measures to address ‘criminal anti-social 
behaviour’, stating that minor disputes should be resolved through mediation and 
conciliation (Labour Party 1995). The following year the Conservative Government 
embedded the notion of antisocial behaviour (ASB) in legislation and inaugurated 
the tide of regulatory reform witnessed over the subsequent two decades. Section 152 
of the Housing Act 1996 enabled courts to grant injunctions against ASB to prevent 
individuals ‘engaging in or threatening to engage in conduct causing or likely to cause 
a nuisance or annoyance’ in areas of social housing. Although ASB was not defined, 
Section 152 stated that an injunction could only be granted when the ‘respondent has 
used or threatened to use violence’. The apparent focus of both main political parties 
at that time was on the repeated, pernicious criminal acts of some social housing tenants 
which existing criminal procedures were deemed ill-equipped to address (Field 2003).
In the years since, ASB has become a major political, media and public preoccupation. 
Over time, however, political and public conceptions of the nature of ASB have changed. 
The legal framing of ASB in Section 1(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (hereafter 
‘the 1998 Act’) as activity ‘that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ 
to persons outside of the perpetrator’s household lacks precision by design. Attempts to 
narrow the definition as the legislation passed through Parliament were resisted by the new 
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Labour Government (Macdonald 2006: 187–8), and the broad definition was defended 
on the grounds that ‘antisocial behaviour is inherently a local problem and falls to be 
defined at a local level’ (House of Commons 2005: 20). In a small number of high-profile 
cases, grievous crime has been termed ASB, thereby ‘trivialising the seriously criminal’ 
(Millie 2013: 72). More often, however, ASB has been the phrase applied to minor infrac-
tions commonly associated with young people. The most frequently cited ASBs witnessed 
by respondents to the Crime Survey for England and Wales 2014/15 were ‘drink-related 
behaviour’, ‘groups hanging around on the streets’ and ‘inconsiderate behaviour’ such 
as ‘youths kicking/throwing balls in inappropriate areas’ and ‘cycling/skateboarding in 
pedestrian areas’ (ONS 2015: 118–9). During the Parliamentary passage of the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill 2013–14, the Coalition Government proposed rede-
fining ASB as ‘conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance’. Amidst concern that 
the new definition could lead to children being punished for ordinary childhood behav-
iours (House of Lords/House of Commons 2013), the House of Lords voted to retain the 
original definition (Hansard 8 January 2014, col 1543). Nonetheless, these developments 
illuminate a ‘general climate of intolerance’ towards children in general and adolescents 
in particular (UNCRC 2008: 6) and a determination to address the risks that they pose to 
an orderly society.
The last two decades have seen the rise of a pre-emptive, precautionary approach 
to crime (Zedner 2007). As successive governments have become preoccupied with 
minimizing the risks posed by young people, ASB interventions have been recast as 
preventative tools to ‘nip crime in the bud’. Although responses to ASB have received 
considerable academic attention (e.g. Brown 2004; Burney 2005; Crawford 2009; Millie 
2009; Crawford 2013), conceptual debate has often proceeded ahead of an empirical 
base or emerged from small-scale studies focused on single ASB interventions (e.g. 
Campbell 2002; Bullock and Jones 2004; Donoghue 2010). Central to this paper, then, 
is the presentation of findings from a large-scale study of ASB interventions to expand 
knowledge and inform debate. While recognizing the importance of the existing litera-
ture on ASB, this paper is underpinned by a somewhat different conceptual framework, 
namely that of regulatory theory. Following Parker et al. (2004: 2), it employs a broad 
definition of ‘regulation’ that encompasses the formal and informal strategies used by 
different actors and their intended and unintended consequences. Usefully, regulation 
scholarship has highlighted the distinctive and interconnected dimensions of effec-
tiveness, responsiveness and coherence within regulatory regimes (pp. 10–11). While 
some ASB scholars have considered the effectiveness of individual tools, this study also 
explored the other dimensions in the regulatory triptych. A companion paper, which 
presents different data gathered during the study, explores the extent to which ASB 
tools are responsive to the behaviour of recipients, their capacity for self-regulation and 
the context within which regulation occurs (Crawford et al. 2016). This paper attends 
to the issue of coherence, looking in particular at the complex interplay between ASB 
sanctions and other strategies of behaviour regulation.
The article begins by outlining contemporary perceptions of the use and impact of 
ASB interventions on juveniles as evidenced in central government policy documents, 
Parliamentary debates and academic commentaries. It proceeds to discuss the aims, 
methods and findings of a large-scale study of the use of ASB interventions with young 
people in England, which was funded by the Nuffield Foundation. The findings coun-
ter assumptions regarding the deployment of ASB interventions in response to minor 
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incivilities; challenge beliefs about the timing of their use within a young person’s devi-
ant trajectory; and refute the logical sequencing of prevention, ASB and youth justice 
interventions. The paper concludes by considering the findings alongside recent youth 
justice trends, highlighting the (sometimes perverse) interaction effects between differ-
ent facets of the regulatory landscape.
Contemporary Perceptions
Central government ASB policies have been presented as a remedy for the ‘everyday 
nuisance, disorder and crime’ (Home Office 2011: 5)  that is often associated with 
young people. It is suggested that early intervention strategies can stop escalation from 
low-level incivilities to more serious antisocial and criminal behaviour. Such determin-
istic arguments tend to neglect the role of agency and the impact of social structures 
on behaviour, and research that ‘shows substantial flows out of as well as in to the pool of 
children who develop chronic conduct problems’ (Utting 2004: 99, emphasis in origi-
nal). Nonetheless, this view prevails, as does the belief that ASB interventions can inter-
rupt a deviant trajectory (Home Office 2014).
Also central to contemporary perceptions is the view that interventions form a hier-
archy of sanctions or pyramidal structure which, some have suggested (Crawford 2009; 
Hoffman and Macdonald 2011), echo Braithwaite’s enforcement pyramid (Braithwaite 
1985). In Braithwaite’s original model, most regulatory activity occurs at the base of 
the pyramid and comprises ‘gentle sanctions’ to encourage self-regulation (Braithwaite 
1985: 142). Persistent miscreants progress up the pyramid through increasingly com-
mand-based sanctions. At the apex of the pyramid, crucially, sits the most punitive 
sanction acting as a deterrent. The latest measures to address ASB, like those which 
they replace, are depicted as forming a pyramid of interventions. They are said to ‘pro-
vide a clearer path of consequences and sanctions for those who consistently fail to 
change their behaviour’ (Home Office 2011: 13), thus embodying notions of progres-
sion and upward travel.
The Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) was introduced by Section 1 of the 1998 
Act and sat at the peak of the enforcement pyramid. Their use rose annually until 2005 
and then declined until 2012, followed by a small rise in 2013 (Home Office/Ministry 
of Justice 2014a). The order had a high breach rate: 58 per cent of ASBOs issued 
between 1 June 2000 and 31 December 2013 were contravened (Home Office/Ministry 
of Justice 2014a). Subsequently, in 2010, the new Coalition Government announced 
plans to replace the ASBO with the Criminal Behaviour Order (CBO) and the Crime 
Prevention Injunction (CPI) that appeared in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act 2014 (hereafter ‘the 2014 Act’) and came into force in October 2014 and 
March 2015, respectively.1
An Acceptable Behaviour Contract (ABC) is an informal or ‘voluntary’ agreement 
that sat beneath the ASBO and now sits under the CBO and CPI in any hierarchy of 
interventions (Home Office 2003; 2011). This agreement between the perpetrator of 
ASB and local practitioners is intended to encourage self-regulation and desistance. 
Although central government no longer collates data on the use of ABCs, historical 
1For a detailed discussion of the development and phases of ‘regulatory hyperactivity’ heralded by the ASB agenda, see 
Crawford (2013) and Crawford et al. (2016), and for an overview of the new measures, see Millie (2013).
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records show that their use consistently outstripped that of ASBOs. According to the 
last available annual figures, 11,881 ABCs were signed in 2007/08 (Home Office 2009) 
while just 2,027 ASBOs were made in 2008 and 1,349 in 2013 (Home Office/Ministry 
of Justice 2014b: Table 1). Evidence as to the effectiveness of ABCs remains inconclusive. 
While some quantitative studies have detected less incivility by signatories after signing 
an ABC than in the period immediately before (Bullock and Jones 2004; NAO 2006) 
and fewer individuals subsequently coming to official notice for ASB (Bullock and Jones 
2004), it is not possible to say whether the intervention actually caused any cessation of 
antisocial activities. High breach rates have been detected, ranging from 27 per cent 
for those aged 18 and over to 61 per cent for those under 18 (NAO 2006). Further, the 
authors of a small-scale, qualitative study noted a ‘lacuna’ between the apparently posi-
tive effects of ABCs when measured quantitatively and their lived reality (Squires and 
Stephen 2005). Many of the children and families studied doubted the evidence against 
them, were concerned about accompanying threats of eviction, and reported receiving 
insufficient support from (in particular) education and social services to address struc-
tural problems. Despite these mixed messages, official discourse remains positive. It has 
recently been claimed that ABCs ‘are often used to deal with low-level antisocial behav-
iour, with one intervention frequently enough to stop the behaviour recurring’ (Home 
Office 2011: 23) and that they can be ‘very effective at dealing with young people early, 
to nip problem behaviours in the bud before they escalate’ (Home Office 2014: 18).
According to the dominant narrative, then, ASB is low-level crime and incivility of a 
kind that is closely associated with young people. Most regulatory activity occurs at the 
base of a ‘pyramid’ of sanctions: these interventions are employed early in the develop-
ment of a deviant trajectory and use persuasion to promote self-regulation and compli-
ance. Travelling up the pyramid, as those persisting in their behaviour progress through 
different measures, sanctions become evermore enforcement oriented. While there was 
a general loss of faith in the effectiveness of the ASBO, which has now been replaced, the 
ABC is still regarded as an effective response to juvenile incivilities. The paper will now 
outline the aims of and methods employed in a study, which explored these assumptions.
Research Aims and Methods
Recent years have seen growing recognition of a dearth in knowledge around the 
nature and prevalence of ASB (Prior 2009) and the use and effectiveness of different 
interventions (Rubin et  al. 2006). In 2008, when this study began, little was known 
about the extent, nature and impact of different ASB interventions on young people; 
young people’s trajectories through different ASB interventions; and their journeys 
through prevention, ASB and youth justice strategies and sanctions. This study was 
designed to address this knowledge gap.
The research was conducted in four purposively selected Community Safety Partnership 
areas. Two are London Boroughs (Sites A and B) and two are large cities in the north 
of England (Sites C and D). All areas were known to have significant levels of crime and 
ASB; large and diverse populations; high levels of social deprivation; and a sizeable social 
housing stock. The sites were also nationally recognized as having developed expertise in 
monitoring and addressing ASB: three were among the ‘Trailblazers’ and ‘Action Areas’ 
that received additional central government funding to address incivility (NAO 2006: 41).
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Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analyzed. As to the for-
mer, the research team collected details of all individuals under 18 years of age who 
received an ASB warning letter, an ABC or an ASBO (hereafter ‘the key sanctions’) 
during a two-year period between 1 April 2008 and 31 March 2010 (hereafter ‘the 
study period’) and tracked their pathways through these different interventions 
over time through local agencies’ databases. In two of the sites, details were also 
gathered of the prevention and youth justice interventions received by this group 
from databases held by local youth offending services. All data were analyzed using 
SPSS. This paper focuses on the findings from this aspect of the study. A detailed 
account of the qualitative research findings, informed by interviews with senior 
managers, practitioners, young people and parents, appears in the companion 
paper (Crawford et al. 2016).
Research Findings
The findings are presented in two sections. The first section describes the number and 
demographic characteristics of young people included in the study; the types of ASB 
interventions delivered; and variations in their use by age, sex and place. The second, 
more discursive section presents and examines those findings that challenge dominant 
policy and public assumptions. It explores the types of behaviour that trigger interven-
tions; variations in the use of sanctions and strategies; the multilayered nature of regu-
lation; the timing of interventions in any developmental trajectory and life course; and 
the implications of these findings for current practice.
Background information about the study subjects and sanctions
Between 1 April 2008 and 31 March 2010, 3,481 young people from the four sites 
received one or more of the key sanctions. Table 1 shows the number from each site 
alongside gender data and mid-2009 10- to 17-year-old population estimates. In the 
three sites where gender data were available, the majority of recipients were male, as 
found in previous studies (e.g. NAO 2006). The number of recipients in relation to the 
Table 1 Number of young people who received interventions by site and gendera
Research  
site
Male  
(N)
Male as % 
of total
Female 
(N)
Female as  
% of total
Total young  
people (N)
Mid-2009 10- 
to 17-year-old 
population 
estimatesb
Number per 
10,000 of 10- 
to 17-year-old 
populationc
Site A 332 83.8 64 16.2 409 15,000 273
Site B 83 84.7 15 15.3 99 12,958 76
Site C 431 81.8 96 18.2 556 68,262 81
Site D – – – – 2,417 47,757 506
aReliable gender data were available in Sites A, B and C in all but a few cases. This explains why Male (N) and 
Female (N) ≠ Total (N). Valid percentage figures are cited here and throughout unless otherwise stated. Robust 
gender data were unavailable in Site D.
bYJB (2011), Annex E.
cThese figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number.
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10- to 17-year-old population size varied widely, being over six times greater in the site 
with the second largest juvenile population (Site D) than in that with the largest such 
population (Site C). Site D, where the number of young people known to have received 
an intervention per 10,000 of the population was highest, was ranked in the Indices of 
Multiple Deprivation 2010 as the second least deprived of the sites (DCLG 2011).2 These 
findings suggest that the use of ASB interventions is not linked directly to population 
size or levels of socioeconomic deprivation, but is mediated by the willingness and abil-
ity of individuals and organizations to use these tools.
The 3,481 study subjects were tracked through agency databases and details gath-
ered of interventions received during and prior to the study period. Table 2 shows the 
number who received interventions by site and intervention type. Warning letters, the 
sanction of first resort, are usually sent by the police, often in conjunction with the local 
council or a social housing provider, to an individual (or their parent or guardian in 
the cases of juveniles) when they first come to official notice for ASB. As such, they form 
the lowest rung in any ladder of sanctions. The research team noted significant varia-
tion between sites in their form and function, which tended to reflect the professional 
priorities of those concerned. In Site A, young people engaged in ASB were referred to 
the Youth Inclusion and Support Panels (YISPs)3 coordinator who had oversight of the 
five YISPs operating across the borough. The YISPs coordinator then sent a ‘referral 
to YISP’ letter to the parents or carers which, as the first stage in the hierarchy of sanc-
tions, constituted a warning for the purposes of this study. The appropriate YISP then 
conducted an assessment of risk and need and, where necessary, facilitated support 
services such as ‘one-to-one work, group work, leisure activities, sport, parent support, 
specific and general advice, [and] counselling’.4 Data on the use of warning letters were 
not available in Site B. In Sites C and D, the police-issued warning letters placed less 
emphasis on the provision of support and focused on the need for greater parental 
control. They also stated that enforcement procedures might ensue should problems 
persist, such as the pursuit of an ABC, the imposition of an ASBO or the loss of a social 
housing tenancy.
The mean age of recipients of warning letters was between 14.77 and 14.83 years in 
the three sites where warning data were available: the small difference in mean ages 
2As indicated by the Indices of Deprivation rank of average rank measure of deprivation.
3YISPs are multi-agency groups that provide prevention services to young people at risk of becoming delinquent (Walker et al. 
2007).
4This text comes from the template ‘referral to YISP letter’ in Site A.
Table 2 Number of young people who received interventions by site and type
Research  
site
Number  
with  
letter (N)
Proportion  
with  
letter (%)
Number  
with  
ABC (N)
Proportion  
with  
ABC (%)
Number  
with  
ASBOa (N)
Proportion  
with  
ASBO (%)
Total young 
people (N)
Site A 405 99 57 13.9 11 2.7 409
Site B – – 97 98 4 4 99
Site C 351 63.1 177 31.8 48 8.6 556
Site D 2,302 95.2 304 12.6 17 0.7 2,417
aThe figures include both civil and criminal ASBOs.
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between sites was not statistically significant.5 Nor was there any statistically significant 
difference in mean ages by sex in the two sites where this information was available 
(Sites A and C).6 Slightly over one quarter (28.0 per cent) were under 14 years old at 
receipt, almost half (47.0 per cent) were 14 or 15 years and the remainder (25.1 per 
cent) were 16 or 17 years. It is worth noting that 25 young people (0.8 per cent) were 
younger than ten years, the youngest having come to official notice in Site D for ‘kick-
ing footballs at properties’7 at the age of five years. The early use of such interventions 
and the nature of the behaviour that prompted their use will be considered later in 
the article. There were also clear variations between sites in the proportion of indi-
viduals who received warning letters and other interventions. The reasons for these 
patterns and their impact on the hierarchical sequencing of interventions will also be 
examined later.
All four sites used ABCs to regulate behaviour. The contracts, which in all sites dis-
played the local police and council logos, listed the prohibited behaviours. Examples 
include ‘I will not cause damage to any property not belonging to me and will not 
encourage others to do so’ (Site C) and ‘I will not write graffiti anywhere’ (Site B). 
Some contracts also included positive requirements such as ‘I will meet with my ABC 
support worker regularly’ (Site B) and ‘I will attend school daily and on time’ (Site A). 
The consequences of breaching the prohibitions were cited: these typically included 
an application for an ASBO and measures in relation to a social housing tenancy (e.g. 
pursuit of a Possession Order or a Demotion Order). The contracts were signed by the 
young person and, if under 16 years of age, an appropriate adult (e.g. their parent or 
guardian) as well as agency representatives.
The mean age of young people on receipt of their first ABC was between 14.2 and 
14.7  years across the four sites. The difference between the two sites with the high-
est (Site D) and lowest (Site C) mean ages was statistically significant.8 The difference 
reflects, in part at least, key differences in the hierarchy of interventions operating in 
each site, as will be explained later in the article. Contrary to expectation, mean age at 
first ABC was lower than mean age at first warning in the three sites where these data 
were available (A, C and D). To explore this further, those individuals who received 
a first warning at least 12 months before the end of the study period were separated 
into two groups, according to whether they also signed an ABC at any point up to the 
end of the study. In Sites A and D, those who received both sanctions were significantly 
younger on receipt of their first warning than those who did not progress to an ABC.9 
This finding is reminiscent of claims by developmental criminologists that early onset 
of deviance leads to a longer and more persistent deviant career (Farrington 1994: 
526). It may be, however, that those who come to official notice at a young age are more 
closely monitored during their adolescence and thus more likely to receive subsequent 
5Age was calculable for 3,051 of the 3,057 recipients. The comparison of means was conducted using a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA).
6Assessed using independent samples T-tests.
7This is the behaviour that precipitated the warning as recorded in the police database.
8Age data were available for 600 of the 635 young people with ABCs. A one-way ANOVA across the four sites found p = 0.039: 
further exploration (post hoc Tukey test) found that only the difference between means in Sites C and D was statistically sig-
nificant (p = 0.046).
9Independent samples T-tests found the difference in mean age at first warning for those with/without an ABC to be statisti-
cally significant in Sites A (p < 0.001) and D (p = 0.001).
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interventions (McAra and McVie 2005; 2007; 2010). In Site C, the situation is compli-
cated by and may, in part, be due to the unusual hierarchy in operation: most of those 
who signed an ABC were not thought to have had a warning letter beforehand. The 
article will return to this point in due course.
Although much debate has focused on the ASBO, it was the least used of the key 
sanctions, as reflected in national statistics and this study. Just 2 per cent of the study 
subjects received an ASBO (2.3 per cent, n = 80). The mean age on receipt of a first 
ASBO ranged from 15.3 to 16.7 years: the difference in mean ages between sites was 
not statistically significant. Mean age at first ASBO was higher than mean age at ABC 
in all four sites.
The types of behaviour that trigger interventions
As already noted, contemporary conceptions of ASB focus on low-level crime and inci-
vility. The Government’s attempt to redefine ASB encountered resistance to bringing 
ordinary childhood activities within any definition of problematic conduct. It seems 
that ASB by young people, in the political and public imagination at least, occupies the 
hinterland between youthful exuberance and serious crime.
Sites A and D described the events that precipitated a referral to the YISPs coordina-
tor or a police warning letter, respectively. There were notable variations between these 
sites in the behaviours that prompted action. In Site A, where 99.0 per cent (n = 405) 
of the 409 cases involved in the study were referred to the YISP and the reason was 
recorded in most cases (95.1 per cent, n = 385), over two thirds involved an offence 
(69.9 per cent, n = 269) as defined by the Youth Justice Board (YJB) for England and 
Wales (YJB 2014). The most commonly occurring offence type was violence against the 
person, recorded in 19.5 per cent of cases. Theft and handling (12.2 per cent), drugs-
related offences (11.2 per cent) and criminal damage (10.6 per cent) were also com-
mon. In those referrals that did not involve criminality, the behaviour was often more 
reminiscent of contemporary conceptions of ASB, such as ‘ASB on estate, disturbance 
to residents’ (IDs 23, 24 and 25) and ‘Throwing items around in a newsagents’ (ID 71).
The referral agency was recorded in 276 (68.1 per cent) of the cases referred to the 
YISP. In most of these cases (62.0 per cent), police made the referral. The YISPs coordi-
nator identified the police as one of the main referral agencies and stated that although 
the police were expected to deal with incivilities that constituted criminal offences ‘they 
started pushing it all onto us’.10 Possible explanations include there being insufficient 
evidence to support a criminal prosecution and a desire by the police to reduce their 
workload. Either way, the use of ASB interventions for alleged criminal conduct occurs 
in the absence of proof, thus bypassing fundamental due process protections afforded 
defendants in criminal proceedings (Ashworth et al. 1998: 10). The use of measures to 
‘nip crime in the bud’ with individuals already engaged in serious or persistent offend-
ing also contradicts their underpinning logic and challenges contemporary perceptions 
of when they occur in any developmental trajectory of deviant behaviour: the haphazard 
coexistence of different regulatory systems will be examined shortly.
In Site D, 2,302 young people received one or more police warning letters. The police 
in Site D operated a two-step system comprising warning letter one (WL1) and warning 
10As stated to the research team on 14 November 2011.
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letter two (WL2). WL1 was designed for use with young people when first apprehended 
for low-level ASB. It asked parents to cooperate with the police by providing advice and 
guidance to their children, thus attempting to employ informal levers of compliance 
to engender voluntary self-regulation. WL2 was intended for those whose behaviour 
remained antisocial after a WL1 or whose first encounter with the police resulted from 
ASB deemed sufficiently serious to merit a WL2. WL2 represented a shift from strate-
gies rooted in voluntary cooperation to enforced compliance: it detailed the possible 
consequences of continued incivility including ABCs, parenting contracts and action 
against social housing tenants. In this site, where 94.1 per cent (n = 2,275) of the 2,418 
cases involved in the study received a WL1 and the reason was recorded in most of 
them (99.7 per cent, n = 2,268), alleged offending was a factor in a smaller propor-
tion of cases (43.7 per cent, n = 992). The most common infractions were ‘other minor 
offences’ which were noted in 29.9 per cent of cases where a reason for the WL1 was 
recorded (n = 677): most of these concerned underage drinking. The second most com-
mon infraction was violence against the person which, in contrast to Site A, was cited 
in just 6.7 per cent of cases (n = 151). Drugs offences, which typically involved cannabis 
use (2.6 per cent, n = 60), arson (2.6 per cent, n = 58) and public order offences (2.4 per 
cent, n = 55) were also noted.
In most cases, then, WL1s were sent in response to non-criminal infractions (56.3 per 
cent, n = 1,276). The throwing of items such as stones, eggs, mud and apples at proper-
ties and vehicles was a common complaint. Other acts included ‘smearing excrement 
on pavement’ (ID 143), ‘kicking footballs at windows’ (ID 543) and ‘shouting, swearing, 
running in road’ (ID 1091), which might reasonably cause harassment, alarm or distress 
and be deemed antisocial. However, letters were also sent to young people for ‘climbing 
on walls’ (ID 93), ‘skateboarding in public areas’ (ID 242), ‘moving park benches’ (ID 
489), being ‘part of a noisy, rowdy, large group’ (ID 595), ‘running through residents’ 
gardens’ (ID 632), throwing ‘snowballs at members of the public’ (ID 1192) and other 
high jinks. It seems that despite efforts by the House of Lords and others to exclude 
ordinary acts of childhood from any official definition of ASB, its capacious nature 
means that such actions are already being sanctioned in some places.
The enforcement pyramid and variations in its operation
Implicit (and sometimes explicit) in contemporary depictions of ASB sanctions is that 
they form a pyramidal system of regulation. There is a presumption that those subject 
to regulation will enter at the base of the pyramid where sanctions are underpinned by 
strategies of persuasion and self-regulation. When these methods fail, escalation up the 
pyramid occurs through measures designed to elicit and ultimately enforce compliance 
through evermore command-based regulation. The ASBO and its replacements, which 
sit at the apex, are redolent of Ayres and Braithwaite’s ‘benign big gun’ (1992: 19–53), 
rarely used but threatening in the background.
Figure  1 presents an enforcement pyramid comprising the sanctions studied and 
corresponding regulatory strategies as typically conceived. This composite depiction of 
practice across the sites obscures myriad variations in practice, however. There were, 
for example, differences in the number of tiers in the pyramidal structure: Site C sent 
those at risk of an ASBO an ‘ASBO warning letter’ that formed an extra tier between 
tiers two and three. Some of the sites operated variants of the same sanction within 
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individual tiers: Site A operated a two-step system of yellow and red ABCs, echoing the 
penalty card system used in football, while Site D operated the two-step warning system 
described above. It was also apparent that, across the sites, the same sanctions were 
sometimes used multiple times before escalation or, in the case of the ASBO, after a 
previous order had expired.
In Site C, the flow of young people into and through the different tiers of sanctions 
defied expectation. In this site, warning letters were issued by the police, while ABCs 
were administered by the local council’s ASB unit. Referrals to the unit came from a 
range of sources including the general public. This division of labour created a fissure 
in the flow of sanctions. As a result, there was little overlap between those sent a warn-
ing letter and those with an ABC: only one fifth (n = 37, 20.9 per cent) of the 177 ABC 
recipients were recorded in police databases as having received a letter. For the majority 
of ABC recipients, then, this sanction marked their entry point into the pyramid, which 
may explain why mean age at first ABC was lower here than in any other site.
This and other evidence suggests that the strategies witnessed do not readily conform 
to responsive regulation as traditionally conceived. According to Braithwaite (2011: 
493), responsive regulators place dialogic, collaborative and restorative sanctions at the 
base of the pyramid and ‘listen actively’ in a manner that ‘gives voice to stakeholders’. 
Punishment is not foregrounded as this may communicate mistrust by the regulator 
and promote defiance by the regulated (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 47–9). In contrast, 
the police warning letters that typically occupy the base of any ASB sanction pyramid 
are issued without discussion and often emphasize the possible consequences of non-
compliance. While ABCs might involve more dialogue, power imbalances between the 
juvenile and practitioner signatories could preclude genuine collaboration (Wonnacott 
1999: 281–2). Furthermore, as shown above and discussed in detail elsewhere, these 
tools also threaten sanctions for non-compliance, often in heavy-handed ways that 
undermine negotiation, trust and voluntariness (Crawford et al. 2016).
These reflections do not amount to an argument for more system contact, however. 
The Edinburgh Study of Youth Transitions and Crime (hereafter ‘the Edinburgh 
Study’) found that prevention and early intervention strategies may actually hinder 
ASBO 
ABC
Warning letter
Persuasion and 
self-regulation
Command-based
regulation
Fig. 1 Enforcement pyramid depicting the key ASB sanctions and strategies 
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desistance, particularly if they cause young people to be labelled as troublesome and 
occur alongside (and potentially precipitate) other interactions with state agencies 
(McAra and McVie 2005; 2007; 2010). This point is particularly pertinent because the 
regulation of ASB does not occur in a vacuum. However, because studies of ASB inter-
ventions have tended to focus on their use in isolation, their existence within a complex 
web of regulation comprising multiple systems, strategies and interventions has hith-
erto been obscured.
The multilayered nature of regulation
Under a strategy of ‘progressive universalism’, the Labour Government of 1997–2010 
advocated the provision of universal services for children while focusing both uni-
versal and targeted services on the most vulnerable to ‘prevent problems escalating’ 
(HM Treasury/DCSF 2007: 15). The Labour Government also overhauled the youth 
justice system, central to which was the introduction of local multi-agency youth offend-
ing teams to work with young offenders. During this period, then, practitioners deliv-
ering ASB sanctions formed one element or ‘node’ in the multinodal governance of 
behaviour (Burris et al. 2005). In this study, additional work was undertaken to explore 
the multilayered nature of regulation as experienced by young people. Individuals with 
ABCs from Site C (n = 171) and Site D (n = 268) were tracked through local authority 
prevention and youth justice databases and details gathered of all interventions going 
back to the earliest recorded (in Site C) or to the start of the study period (in Site D) 
and forward to the end of the study period.11 Workload pressures on staff in the London 
Boroughs precluded these additional data being extracted in Sites A and B. Restricting 
the analysis to individuals with ABCs minimized, the burden on practitioners in Sites C 
and D charged with mining their prevention and youth justice databases. The findings 
have continued relevance because the ABC, unlike the ASBO, remains a firm fixture 
on the regulatory landscape.
Many of the young people with ABCs were subject to multiple sanctions and strate-
gies of behaviour regulation. Turning first to prevention work with the 171 young signa-
tories to ABCs in Site C, 69 (40.4 per cent) appeared in the local authority’s prevention 
database by the end of the study period. Most (61.6 per cent) of the 1,467 prevention 
activities undertaken by the end of the study period were recorded as Positive Activities 
for Young People (PAYP).12 PAYP activities by young people included horse riding, mar-
tial arts, canoeing and school holiday activities, while PAYP work related to young people 
included professional meetings and telephone calls between practitioners. However, 
case records by council workers who monitored compliance with ABCs documented 
other social welfare focused prevention work with young people on ABCs, the details 
11In Site C, the tracking was of 171 people who had signed an ABC at any point up to 31 March 2010. The details of six signa-
tories to ABCs organized by the police acting alone emerged after the youth justice and prevention data were gathered: these 
cases were excluded. The site supplied details of data subjects’ prevention and youth justice interventions up to 31 March 2010. 
In Site D, the analysis was limited to 268 individuals who had signed an ABC between 1 April 2008 and 31 March 2010 and the 
prevention and youth justice data cover this period. It excluded 33 individuals whose only ABC occurred before this period, two 
people who were over 18 when they signed their ABC and one person whose date of birth was ambiguous. Thus, the parameters 
of the analysis in Sites C and D are not identical and any comparisons are made with this caveat in mind.[AU: Please note that]
12In 2003, the Labour Government announced plans to fund local PAYP schemes to support young people at risk of social 
exclusion (CRG 2006).
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(and sometimes the recipients) of which were absent from the central prevention data-
base. Thus, the proportion of ABC recipients who received such services, and the total 
amount of agency contact across the group, are higher than these data suggest.
Of the 268 signatories to ABCs in Site D, 70 (26.1 per cent) incurred 2,249 prevention 
interventions between 1 April 2008 and 31 March 2010. Others may have incurred pre-
vention measures prior to this period; thus, the number engaged in prevention activi-
ties by 31 March 2010 may be higher. Practitioners recorded most of these interventions 
as having occurred ‘in person’ (n = 1,380, 61.4 per cent). It is apparent from the qualita-
tive descriptions of these ‘in person’ events, however, that only some involved face-to-
face contact with young people (e.g. during ‘group work’ or ‘home visits’), while others 
did not (e.g. ‘discussion with colleague’) or it was unclear (e.g. ‘education meeting/
contact’, ‘management supervision of case’, ‘assessment meeting’). What is apparent, 
however, is that much practitioner time and effort was spent on these young people in 
the name of prevention.
Turning now to ABC recipients’ pathways into and through the youth justice system, 
over three quarters of those from Site C (77.8 per cent, n = 133) had been charged with 
a criminal offence and incurred a total of 1,461 charges by the end of the study period. 
The mean number of charges was significantly greater for those whose first ABC came 
before or in Year 1 rather than in Year 2.13 This suggests that ABCs did not stem the 
flow of charges, which continued to accumulate over time. In Site D, over half of the 
ABC recipients (57.1 per cent, n = 153) incurred a total of 736 charges during the study 
period. As in Site C, the mean number of charges was greater for those whose first ABC 
came before or in Year 1 than in Year 2, although the difference was not statistically 
significant.
There were notable differences between the sites in the most prevalent charges. In 
Site C, the most prevalent charge was breach of a statutory order, which was incurred 
by 48 individuals and accounted for over one fifth of all charges (22.0 per cent, n = 321). 
From the ASBO’s inception, critics have argued that this statutory order, breach of 
which was a criminal offence, might actually propel individuals into the criminal justice 
system (Ashworth et al. 1998). However, less than half (n = 23) of those charged with 
breach of a statutory order had breached an ASBO and this was rarely their first or only 
charge. In Site D, in contrast, breach of a statutory order was the fifth most common 
charge: it was incurred by 27 individuals and accounted for just one tenth of all charges 
(10.7 per cent, n = 79). Although the data do not specify the nature of the breach, only 
three of these individuals had an ASBO and incurred 12 unspecified charges of breach 
between them, suggesting that breach of an ASBO was uncommon.
In Site C, the next three most prevalent charges were theft and handling stolen 
goods, violence against the person and criminal damage, which together accounted for 
over one third of charges (36.8 per cent). These charges were also prevalent in Site D, 
where violence against the person, theft and handling and criminal damage were the 
first, second and fourth most prevalent charges, respectively, and together accounted 
for over two fifths of all charges (42.8 per cent). Public order offences were the third 
most prevalent charge in Site D and the fifth most common in Site C (accounting for 
13.3 and 9.0 per cent of charges, respectively).
13Where the first ABC was on or before 31 March 2009, the mean number of charges was 11.7. Where the first ABC occurred 
between 1 April 2009 and 31 March 2010, this figure was 5.5. An independent samples T-test showed the difference in means to 
be statistically significant (p < 0.001).
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The YJB’s gravity scores indicate the seriousness of different offences and range from 
one (least serious) to eight (YJB 2014). The data were examined to determine the high-
est gravity score for charges attached to ABC recipients. In Site C, the most frequent 
(modal) highest gravity score was six, attained by 41.4 per cent of those known to youth 
offending services (n = 55), typically for domestic burglary, drugs offences or robbery. 
In Site D, the most frequent (modal) highest gravity score was three, attained by 27.5 
per cent of those known to youth offending services (n = 42), typically for theft, com-
mon assault or assault by beating. In both sites, the mean gravity score was greater 
for those whose first ABC came before or in Year 1 rather than in Year 2. Although 
the differences were not statistically significant, they suggest that the charges incurred 
became more severe over time.
Site C also provided details of youth justice outcomes. Almost all of the ABC recip-
ients known to youth offending services were recorded as having one or more sub-
stantive outcomes (n = 131, 98.5 per cent), defined by the YJB as pre-court decisions, 
first-tier penalties, community penalties and custodial sentences (YJB 2014: 45). Just 17 
of these young people incurred a custodial penalty. As might be expected, they tended 
to have lengthy criminal histories and to have progressed through pre-court, first-tier 
and community penalties. Most (n = 12) had been charged with breach of an ASBO at 
some point with the majority (n = 10) having been charged multiple times: the number 
of such charges varied between 1 and 39. The consideration of these charges alongside 
others may have increased overall sentence severity in line with the totality principle, 
according to which sentences should reflect all of the behaviour under consideration 
while remaining just and proportionate (Sentencing Council 2012: 5). It may also have 
accelerated young people’s journeys through lower-level interventions and towards 
custody.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that some recipients of ASB interventions 
endure the haphazard and concurrent use of multiple sanctions and strategies of 
behaviour regulation. That regulation often involves multiple regulators has been well 
documented within the corporate sphere (Braithwaite 2011: 507–10; Heimer 2011) but 
not in relation to young people. If behavioural change is a staged process and efforts 
to alter behaviour work best when aligned with a person’s readiness and capacity to 
change (Prochaska and DiClemente 1982), it seems unlikely that prevention, ASB and 
youth justice strategies, which typically employ different levers of compliance, would 
simultaneously be effective in promoting behavioural change. Evidence that increased 
levels of system contact may inhibit desistance also poses a challenge to the current 
approach (McAra and McVie 2007).
The timing of interventions in any developmental trajectory
As already noted, dominant narratives suggest a hierarchical sequencing of interven-
tions, whereby informal measures to address incivility are tried first, with recourse to 
more formal and eventually criminal sanctions if this strategy fails. The swift use of 
informal sanctions is designed to ‘nip crime in the bud’ with those at the start of a devi-
ant trajectory who may still be open to strategies of persuasion and collaboration. The 
timing of ASB interventions in the developmental trajectories of ABC recipients from 
Sites C and D was examined to see whether such conceptions are reflected in practice.
LEWIS ET AL.
1242
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article-abstract/57/5/1230/2623977
by Manchester Metropolitan University user
on 10 July 2018
In Site C, the date of first ABC and first charge were known for most (n = 122) of the 
133 ABC recipients with criminal charges. In most cases, charges preceded the ABC 
(n = 104, 85.2 per cent), often by over a year (n = 68). It is clear, from both the youth 
justice data and the case records kept by those monitoring compliance with ABCs, that 
some ABC recipients were already entrenched in criminal behaviour. For example, the 
case notes made before an ABC was signed with one young person (ID 15) stated that 
his parents had ‘lost control over him for the past few years’ and he was ‘not engaging 
with services’. There were concerns that he was ‘taking drugs and drug running’ and 
other offences were documented (‘he steals from his parents and grandparents’; ‘about 
a year ago he robbed an old lady’; ‘he assaulted his father who had him arrested’). The 
use of ABCs with people with established criminal careers contradicts the developmen-
tal logic of ASB strategies as tools to nip nascent criminality in the bud. Also, evidence 
suggests that the targeted use of ABCs with people who are at least considering chang-
ing their behaviour may have more chance of success (Prochaska and DiClemente 
1982).
In Site D, the date of first ABC (at any time up to 31 March 2010) and the date of 
first charge (between 1 April 2008 and 31 March 2010) were known for all of the 153 
ABC recipients with criminal charges. In over half of these cases (n = 86, 56.2 per cent), 
the first ABC preceded the first known charge; in the remaining cases (n = 67, 43.8 per 
cent), the first known charge came first. However, some of these young people may 
have incurred charges before 1 April 2008, so the number of individuals who incurred 
a criminal charge before signing an ABC may have been higher. Further investigation 
found evidence of ABCs being used with young people with multiple criminal charges. 
One individual, for example, had incurred 11 charges of theft and handling stolen 
goods, breach of a statutory order, breach of bail, violence and criminal damage before 
signing an ABC aged 13 years (ID 303), while another had incurred five charges of 
criminal damage, public order offences, breach of bail and breach of a statutory order 
before signing an ABC aged 16 years (ID 377). Again, the use of ABCs ‘to nip crime in 
the bud’ when crime is already in bloom contradicts the dominant rationale for such 
measures and may be ineffective.
Taken together, the findings show that 104 of the 171 individuals with ABCs from 
Site C (60.8 per cent) and at least 67 of the 268 ABC recipients from Site D (25.0 per 
cent) incurred one or more criminal charges before their ABC. This confirms the mul-
tilayered nature of regulation and the parallel (rather than consecutive) use of ASB 
measures and youth justice sanctions in some areas. While this confounds dominant 
narratives about the timing of interventions in a developmental trajectory, the bidi-
rectional flow of young people between these systems of social control is unsurprising 
given the police role as a principal gatekeeper to both systems. The Edinburgh Study 
found that while persistent serious offending, low socioeconomic status and engage-
ment in ‘risky’ behaviours (e.g. drug and alcohol consumption, truancy and ‘hanging 
around’) increased young people’s risk of having adversarial contact with the police, 
having ‘previous form’ was ‘by far the most powerful’ predictor of future and more 
serious contact with the police (McAra and McVie 2005: 21). As the police gaze falls on 
‘the usual suspects’, so the incivilities of some individuals in particular may be targeted 
through cyclical processes that foster more and more serious police contact (McAra 
and McVie 2005; 2007).
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Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated how ASB interventions may be triggered by a wide range 
of attributes and behaviours including being ‘at risk’ of harm or becoming delinquent, 
engaging in everyday childhood misdemeanours and diverse actions spanning low-
level incivilities through to serious criminal infractions. Practice is frequently shaped 
by practitioners’ organizational priorities. Correspondingly, opinions vary between 
different professionals, and within and between areas, as to what constitutes ASB. 
Abundant variation persists between sites in the operation of an enforcement pyramid 
of key sanctions to address ASB. The existence in some localities of additional ‘tiers’, 
and the multiple use of informal and voluntary sanctions, might be rationalized as a 
means of diverting young people away from more formal sanctions and allowing them 
to ‘grow out of crime’ before incurring a criminal conviction. Conversely, however, if 
‘discipline…begets further and greater discipline’ (McAra and McVie 2012: 368), then 
these practices might have the very opposite effect, serving to ossify problematic behav-
iour through processes of heightened surveillance and labelling.
Many of the signatories to ABCs in this study were subject to multiple (and some-
times contradictory) strategies of behaviour regulation, appearing simultaneously in 
prevention, ASB and youth justice caseloads. The research found evidence of ABCs 
being signed after criminal charges had been incurred, and by young people with long 
offending histories, apparently contradicting the dominant rationale for their use as 
a means of forestalling a deviant trajectory. Despite widespread belief that ABCs are 
effective in this regard, the cohorts studied here incurred more, and more serious, 
criminal charges in the period after the first ABC than in the same period before. This 
is not to suggest that the ABC caused an overall deterioration in behaviour across these 
groups. In the absence of self-report data, it is not possible to say whether the increased 
number and severity of charges reflected a deterioration in behaviour, or increased 
monitoring, or a combination of both. What is clear, however, is that the findings do not 
support the notion that ABCs, as used in the study sites, actually ‘nip crime in the bud’.
Nonetheless, England and Wales has seen a sustained decline in victim-reported 
crime since the mid-1990s (ONS 2016). Paradoxically, reductions in the number of 
first time entrants to the youth justice system and the number of juveniles sentenced 
only date from the years ending March 2007 and March 2008, respectively (Ministry 
of Justice/YJB 2016). One compelling explanation, given the timing of the statistical 
shifts, may be the impact of two contradictory trends in the response to juvenile incivil-
ity. The first, as exemplified by the Labour Government’s ASB agenda and the use of 
ASBOs and ABCs in the decade leading up to 2007/08, involved processes of ‘defining 
deviancy up’ through early intervention such that ‘once innocent behaviour now stands 
condemned as deviant’ (Krauthammer 1993: 20). More recently, we may have been 
witnessing a countercurrent to earlier trends, resulting in redefining ‘deviancy down’ 
(Moynihan 1993) through greater recourse to diversion. Our research adds weight to 
the view that thresholds for early intervention are highly variable not only across locali-
ties, social groups and tenure type but also across time. 
When senior practitioners from one of the research sites were asked in 2016 about 
shifting youth justice trends and developments,14 they confirmed the impact of such 
14In March 2016, members of the research team discussed recent trends with the Directors of Children’s Services and the 
Youth Offending Service in Site C.
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‘threshold dynamics’. The abolition of targets to increase offences brought to justice 
was described as having had ‘the biggest single impact’ on local trends. These targets, 
introduced in 2001 and subsequently criticized for encouraging the police to pursue 
minor offences (Morgan 2007), were amended in 2008 to focus on violent crimes before 
being abolished in 2010 (Ministry of Justice 2014: 5). Additionally, local Safer School’s 
Partnerships (DCSF et al. 2009) have enabled police to work alongside local schools to 
address problems at the outset, prompting schools to ‘consume their own smoke’—i.e. 
manage problems internally and less formally. More generally, the senior practitioners 
maintained that minor cases that appeared in the youth court a decade ago were no 
longer doing so, driven by a recognition that ‘young people need to be dealt with as low 
down as possible’ in the criminal justice process.
To date, there are no official data on, or empirical studies of, the use of the orders 
that have replaced the ASBO. As noted above, however, the ASBO was the least used 
of the key sanctions. This paper has focused on other, more widely used, informal and 
voluntary measures that remain central to ongoing strategies of behaviour regula-
tion. It could be argued that ASB warning letters, ABCs and ASBOs also contributed 
(intentionally or otherwise) to recent youth justice trends. The findings discussed 
here, however, preclude such a simplistic conclusion. Rather than operating in isola-
tion, such tools form interconnected parts of a bigger whole, a ‘regulatory ecosystem’, 
which interacts with the wider socioeconomic and political landscape. This paper has 
examined the complex and contradictory norms that inform, and the interactions 
between, prevention, ASB and youth justice interventions. However, as Black (2001: 
208) notes, ‘regulation occurs in many locations, in many fora’ and ‘in many rooms’ 
and interaction effects between these and other individual and family-focused strate-
gies of behaviour regulation are also likely. Moreover, the overall effect of any regula-
tory regime may be shaped by external forces, as the history of defining deviancy up 
and down illustrates.
These arguments have implications for theoretical perspectives on the regulation 
of problem youth. Traditional debates about the effectiveness of individual tools and 
strategies are insufficient when regulation takes place ‘in many rooms’. They should 
also serve to remind criminologists that efforts to induce behavioural change outside 
of the criminal justice system can constitute potent, punitive and disciplinary sanc-
tions. Hence, new conceptual tools are needed that are attuned to the complex interac-
tion effects between different sanctions and strategies, their intended and unintended 
effects and their existence within a wider regulatory landscape. The evidence presented 
here and elsewhere (Crawford et al. 2016) should provide a stimulus to ongoing debates 
about the operation and efficacy of contemporary mechanisms to regulate juvenile 
behaviour and a platform for future theoretical development.
While the panoply of ASB interventions, when first introduced, formed part of a wider 
governmental agenda that ‘defined deviancy up’, the current landscape may afford 
new opportunities to revisit their role, rationale and (crucially) their conformity with 
principles of responsive regulation and procedural fairness. Thus, re-envisaged, ABCs 
and early warnings might afford more appropriate levels of challenge and support to 
address youthful misconduct, in ways that avoid unnecessary stigmatization, coercion 
and criminalization. This will necessitate a coordinated and coherent approach that 
is attentive to interaction effects between the many mechanisms of regulation that 
impinge on young people’s behaviour.
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